NASA Blames Faulty Aluminum for 2 Failed Launches
Glory satellite (Credit: NASA)
WASHINGTON (NASA PR) — NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) investigators have determined the technical root cause for the Taurus XL launch failures of NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) and Glory missions in 2009 and 2011, respectively: faulty materials provided by aluminum manufacturer, Sapa Profiles, Inc. (SPI).
LSP’s technical investigation led to the involvement of NASA’s Office of the Inspector General and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ’s efforts, recently made public, resulted in the resolution of criminal charges and alleged civil claims against SPI, and its agreement to pay $46 million to the U.S. government and other commercial customers. This relates to a 19-year scheme that included falsifying thousands of certifications for aluminum extrusions to hundreds of customers.
NASA’s updated public summary of the launch failures, which was published Tuesday, comes after a multiyear technical investigation by LSP and updates the previous public summaries on the Taurus XL launch failures for the OCO and Glory missions. Those public summaries concluded that the launch vehicle fairing — a clamshell structure that encapsulates the satellite as it travels through the atmosphere — failed to separate on command, but no technical root cause had been identified.
From NASA’s investigation, it is now known that SPI altered test results and provided false certifications to Orbital Sciences Corporation, the manufacturer of the Taurus XL, regarding the aluminum extrusions used in the payload fairing rail frangible joint. A frangible joint is a structural separation system that is initiated using ordnance.
“NASA relies on the integrity of our industry throughout the supply chain. While we do perform our own testing, NASA is not able to retest every single component. That is why we require and pay for certain components to be tested and certified by the supplier,” said Jim Norman, NASA’s director for Launch Services at NASA Headquarters in Washington. “When testing results are altered and certifications are provided falsely, missions fail. In our case, the Taurus XLs that failed for the OCO and Glory missions resulted in the loss of more than $700 million, and years of people’s scientific work. It is critical that we are able to trust our industry to produce, test and certify materials in accordance with the standards we require. In this case, our trust was severely violated.”
To protect the government supply chain, NASA suspended SPI from government contracting and proposed SPI for government-wide debarment. The exclusion from government contracting has been in effect since Sept. 30, 2015. NASA also has proposed debarment for Hydro Extrusion Portland, Inc.,formerly known as SPI,and the company currently is excluded from contracting throughout the federal government.
“Due in large part to the hard work and dedication of many highly motivated people in the NASA Launch Services program, we are able to close out the cause of two extremely disappointing launch vehicle failures and protect the government aerospace supply chain,” said Amanda Mitskevich, LSP program manager at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in, Florida. “It has taken a long time to get here, involving years of investigation and testing, but as of today, it has been worth every minute, and I am extremely pleased with the entire team’s efforts.”
To learn more about NASA’s Launch Services Program, visit:
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/launchingrockets/index.html
18 responses to “NASA Blames Faulty Aluminum for 2 Failed Launches”
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We had a similar incident at the aviaton depot where I work. The incorrectly marked billet was machined into a landing gear component- which failed spectacularly.
Wow, this investigation took so long that the launch provider was acquired twice in the process.
Once. Orbital acquired ATK before it was, itself, acquired by Northrop Grumman.
This is reminiscent of the CRS-7 anomaly. It must have been a design flaw.
Depending on your suppliers without verifying certainly can be.
I understand how the sub-standard strut could have caused the SpX/CRS-7 loss, but I’ve not seen an explanation of how, on these Taurus flights, a sub-standard frangible joint rail (one falling below Minimum Yield Strength and Ultimate Tensile Strength requirements) caused the joint not to separate. If anything, I’d expect the understrength component to fail prematurely.
I think the material was too hard. The explosive charge was not strong enough to break the joint. Always consider the opposite. Sub does mean below, but could mean it did not meet specs. Which could be too hard. Or the material was not the expected type of Al that the explosive could cut. A lot of times they use frangible nuts. The fairing would slide over the bolts. A spring used to separate. A strut construction is interesting. Maybe an overlap with explosive in between. Or a n explosive placed on the strut and held in place in some manner. A clamp maybe. I don’t know how it is made. Still have to have something to push the faring apart. No air stream to blow it back.
It wasn’t a design flaw in either case, it was substandard material with fake paperwork. This demonstrates the essential worthlessness of paper certifications.
I don’t think CRS-7 was fake paperwork. The error was not recognized that it could cause the problem by someone. The chain to The FAA was broken. I do not think they knew about it. They can not do anything unless it gets to the right person and they act. Maybe a computer review would be better. I sent a concern on the House Science Committee site. Whistle Blower. I do not know yet if it has caused them to check yet.
PS: I just reviewed the IRT report. It is on the new Dragon-2 report by Doug. NASA, FAA, USAF all knew the findings. SpaceX did corrections. That is all they were penalized. No firing or fines that I know of. Nothing. Except they were awarded more flights. They figured they have such a good record, I guess. WOW! Unbelievable. I do have hope that Sen. Shelby might penalize them.
More Dummies problems. This is the biggest problem in America today. Dummies hiring Dummies. They must be weeded out. All the people that NASA has killed in Space accidents sound like Dummies problem. IQ tests and interviews have to be done and supervisors must check what the young people are doing. I hope this problem was not caused by the PC. 60 years ago in HS I could talk to everyone and they knew what I was talking about. Today?
Once again you are entirely off base. Root cause was willful falsification of test results of a subtier vendor’s product. Did you even read the report they posted? Probably not, or more likely you dont understand the words and so make up your own laughable assessment. I guess I need to stop feeding the troll..
Wrong. A dummy falsified the report. A smart person would never do this. They would determine the possible consequences and do what they were suppose to do.They did not have the correct amount of explosive for the AL provided. This is old news. I read the report several years ago. This is just news that the case is final. You are a possible Dummy yourself IMHO. You should check.
https://www.appropriations….
This is the NASA hearing today with Bridenstine at 2:30 Est. Might have some news.
From the report: “The frangible joints for T8 [the 2009 flight] and T9 [the 2011 flight] were made and assembled together, at the same time.” and “Subsequently, on August 18, 2012, NASA’s Launch Services Program (LSP) began a technical investigation to find the root cause of the mishaps. As part of its investigation, LSP performed material properties testing on remnants (AKA: “trimmings”) from the T8 and T9 extrusion processing and found the results did not match the certifications provided by SPI.”
Perhaps I am missing something, but I’d have thought that the T8 investigation boards would have, at the very least, tested T8 frangible joint trimmings, and likely tested a complete, unflown, T9 frangible joint. Fool me once, …
Trust but verify. Got to keep some sort of eye on everything. It’s unlikely that a dishonest supplier left no warning signs that would have been noticed by the cautious.
But the paperwork was all in order…
I think Dick Cheney shot it to keep climate change science down 😉
–from MSNBC no doubt…
As part of its investigation, LSP performed material properties testing
on remnants (AKA: “trimmings”) from the T8 and T9 extrusion processing
and found the results did not match the certifications provided by SPI.”
They tested trimmings from T8 and T9 it says. Perhaps your IPad is not showing the whole text. I do not know the board you speak of, but LSP did test it says.Which I think is good enough.