Russian Launch Failures Aren’t a Bug, They’re a Feature
A Proton takes a nose dive at Baikonur. (Credit: Tsenki TV)
by Douglas Messier
Managing Edior
Over the past few years, I’ve been keeping track of Russia’s annual launch failures. For reasons I can’t quite recall, the table I’ve used only went back to 2009.
Recently, I saw a graphic on a Russian website about launch failures, and I realized I hadn’t gone back far enough. So, I dug into the records of the last 30 years from 1988 through 2017, which covers Russia and the last four years of the Soviet Union.
And holy crap! There were a helluva lot of them. Launch failures are not a bug in the system, they’re a feature.
The table below shows all the failed and partially failed launches from 1988 to 2017. I’ve included the causes of the failures where possible. I wasn’t able to find causes for five of the launches; if anyone has reliable sources on these flights please let me know in the comments section.
| RUSSIAN LAUNCH FAILURES, 1988 – 2017 | |||||
| NO. | DATE | LAUNCH VEHICLE |
PAYLOAD(S) |
RESULT | CAUSE |
| 1 | January 18, 1988 | Proton-K Blok-DM-2 | Gorizont 25L | Failure | Third stage failure due to disintegration of propellant feed line |
| 2 | February 17, 1988 | Proton-K Blok-DM-2 | Uragan #23, Uragan #24, Uragan #25 | Partial Failure | Blok D failure caused by ingestion of debris |
| 3 | July 09, 1988 | Soyuz-U | Yantar-4KS1 #10 | Failure | |
| 4 | July 27, 1988 | Soyuz-U | Resurs-F1 | Failure | First stage engine failure. |
| 5 | November 11, 1988 | Soyuz-U | Yantar-4KS1 #11 | Failure | |
| 6 | June 9, 1989 | Tsiklon-3 | Okean-O1 #4 | Failure | |
| 7 | April 3, 1990 | Soyuz-U | Yantar-4K2 #51 | Failure | |
| 8 | June 21, 1990 | Molniya-M (Blok-2BL) | Kosmos 2084 | Partial Failure | Placed in an incorrect orbit. Satellite did not communicate with ground |
| 9 | July 3, 1990 | Soyuz-U | Yantar-4K2 #53 | Failure | |
| 10. | August 9, 1990 | Proton-K Blok-DM-2 | Ekran-M 14L | Failure | Third stage lost thrust due to a cleaning rag inside propellant feed system |
| 11 | October 4, 1990 | Zenit-2 | Tselina-2 #8 | Failure | First stage engine failure five seconds after launch. |
| 12 | June 25, 1991 | Kosmos-3M | Taifun-2 #26 | Failure | Second stage malfunction |
| 13 | August 30, 1991 | Zenit-2 | Tselina-2 #9 | Failure | Second stage explosion |
| 14 | February 5, 1992 | Zenit-2 | Tselina-2 #10 | Failure | Second stage failure |
| 15 | May 27, 1993 | Proton-K Blok-DM-2 | Gorizont 39L | Failure | Third stage failure |
| 16 | May 25, 1994 | Tsiklon-3 | Tselina-D #69 | Failure | Software error prevented third stage separation |
| 17 | March 28, 1995 | Start | Gurwin 1, EKV, OSCAR 29 | Failure | Failed to orbit, crashed into the Sea of Okhotsk |
| 18 | October 6, 1995 | Kosmos-3M | Kosmos 2321 (Parus #84) | Partial Failure | Second stage malfunction, placed in useless orbit |
| 19 | February 19, 1996 | Proton-K Blok-DM-2 | Raduga 33 | Partial Failure | Blok-DM-2 upper stage failed to restart to circularize orbit |
| 20 | May 14, 1996 | Soyuz-U | Yantar-1KFT #18 | Failure | Payload fairing disintegrated in flight |
| 21 | June 20, 1996 | Soyuz-U | Yantar-4K2 #76 | Failure | Payload fairing disintegrated in flight |
| 22 | November 16, 1996 | Proton-K Blok-D-2 | Mars ’96 | Partial Failure | Probe re-entered atmosphere after fourth stage failure |
| 23 | May 20, 1997 | Zenit-2 | Tselina-2 #19 | Failure | First stage failure |
| 24 | December 24, 1997 | Proton-K Blok-DM3 | AsiaSat 3 | Partial Failure | Fourth stage malfunction prevented satellite from reaching geosynchronous orbit; salvaged with lunar flyby |
| 25 | June 15, 1998 | Tsiklon-3 | Strela-3 #119, Strela-3 #120, Strela-3 #121, Strela-3 #122, Strela-3 #123, Strela-3 #124 | Partial Failure | Third stage malfunction left satellites in unintended elliptical orbit |
| 26 | September 09, 1998 | Zenit-2 | Globalstar 5, Globalstar 7, Globalstar 9, Globalstar 10, Globalstar 11, Globalstar 12, Globalstar 13, Globalstar 16, Globalstar 17, Globalstar 18, Globalstar 20, Globalstar 21 | Failure | Second stage shut down after guidance system failed |
| 27 | July 05, 1999 | Proton-K Briz-M | Raduga (34) (Gran 45L) | Failure | Second stage failure |
| 28 | October 27, 1999 | Proton-K Blok-DM-2M | Ekspress-A 1 | Failure | Second stage failure |
| 29 | December 24, 1999 | Rokot-K | RVSN 40 | Failure | Stage-separation fired before launch |
| 30 | November 20, 2000 | Kosmos-3M | QuickBird 1 (QB 1) | Failure | Second stage failed to ignite |
| 31 | December 27, 2000 | Tsiklon-3 | Gonets 7, Gonets 8, Gonets 9, Strela-3 #125, Strela-3 #126, Strela-3 #127 | Failure | Third stage failure |
| 32 | October 15, 2002 | Soyuz-U | Foton-M 1 | Failure | First stage exploded seconds after launch |
| 33 | November 25, 2002 | Proton-K Blok-DM3 | Astra 1K | Failure | Blok-DM3 left satellite in unusable orbit; spacecraft de-orbited 15 days after launch |
| 34 | Dec. 24, 2004 | Tsiklon-3 | Sich 1M, Micron 1 | Partial Failure | Booster failed to circularize orbit |
| 35 | June 21, 2005 | Molniya-M Blok-ML | Molniya-3K | Failure | Third stage failure |
| 36 | June 21, 2005 | Volna-O | Cosmos 1 | Failure | Cosmos Studios/The Planetary Society solar sail satellite failed to separate from booster third stage |
| 37 | August 10, 2005 | Rokot Briz-KM | Cryosat | Failure | Second stage failure; crashed in Arctic Ocean north of Greenland |
| 38 | February 28, 2006 | Proton-M Briz-M | Arabsat 4A (Badr 1) | Failure | Failed to reach usable orbit; de-orbited 24 days after launch |
| 39 | July 26, 2006 | Dnepr | BelKa 1, Baumanets 1, Unisat 4, PicPot, CP 1, CP 2, HAUSAT 1, ICECube 1, ICECube 2, ION, KUTESat-Pathfinder, Mea Huaka’i, MEROPE, Ncube 1, Rincon 1, SACRED SEEDS, AeroCube 1 | Failure | Engine failure |
| 40 | Sept. 5, 2007 | Proton-M/Briz-M | JCSat 11 | Failure | Second stage failure; booster and payload crashed in Kazakhstan |
| 41 | March 14, 2008 | Proton-M/Briz-M | AMC 14 | Partial Failure | Briz-M upper stage shut down 2 minutes early. Owner SES Americom declared satellite a complete loss. AMC 14 sold to US Department of Defense which manuevered into geosynchronous orbit using on-board thrusters. |
| 42 | May 21, 2009 | Soyuz-2.1a/ Fregat | Meridian 2 | Failure | Second stage shut down early, Fregat upper stage ran out of fuel trying to compensate. Satellite left in useless orbit, declared a loss by Russian military. |
| 43 | Dec. 5, 2010 | Proton-M/ Blok-DM-3 | Uragan-M #739, Uragan-M #740, Uragan-M #741 | Failure | Rocket failed to reach orbital velocity after upper stage overfilled with propellant. |
| 44 | Feb. 1, 2011 | Rokot/Briz-KM | Geo-IK-2 No. 11 | Failure | Upper stage malfunction. |
| 45 | Aug. 17, 2011 | Proton-M/ Briz-M | Ekspress AM4 |
Failure | Briz-M upper stage suffered failure of attitude control. |
| 46 | Aug. 24, 2011 | Soyuz-U | Progress M-12 | Failure | Third stage failure due to turbo-pump duct blockage. |
| 47 | Nov. 8, 2011 | Zenit-2SB/ Fregat | Phobos-Grunt Yinghuo-1 |
Failure | Zenit placed Phobos-Grunt in proper orbit. Spacecraft stranded in Earth orbit after Fregat failed to fire. |
| 48 | Dec. 23, 2011 | Soyuz-2.1b/ Fregat | Meridian 5 | Failure | Third stage failure. |
| 49 | Aug. 6, 2012 | Proton-M/ Briz-M | Telkom-3, Ekspress MD2 | Failure | Briz-M upper stage failed 7 seconds into its third burn. |
| 50 | Dec. 8, 2012 | Proton-M/ Briz-M | Yamal-402 | Partial Failure | Briz-M upper stage shut down 4 minutes earlier than planned on fourth burn. Spacecraft reached intended orbit under own power. |
| 51 | Jan. 15, 2013 | Rokot/Briz-KM | Kosmos 2482, Kosmos 2483, Kosmos 2484 | Partial Failure | Upper stage failed near time of spacecraft separation; one satellite destroyed. |
| 52 | Feb. 1, 2013 | Zenit-3SL (Sea Launch) |
Intelsat 27 | Failure | First stage failure. |
| 53 | July 2, 2013 | Proton-M/DM-03 | Uragan-M #748, Uragan-M #749, Uragan-M #750 |
Failure | First stage failure. |
| 54 | May 15, 2014 | Proton-M/Briz-M | Ekspress AM4R | Failure | Proton third stage vernier engine failure due to turbo-pump leak. |
| 55 | Aug. 14, 2014 | Soyuz-STB/ Fregat | Galileo FOC-1, Galileo FOC-2 | Partial Failure | Satellites placed in wrong orbits due to freezing of hydrazine in Fregat upper stage. Satellites made operational as part of Europe’s Galileo navigation constellation. |
| 56 | April 28, 2015 | Soyuz-2.1a | Progress 59P | Failure | Third stage failure left Progress in uncontrollable tumble. |
| 57 | May 16, 2015 | Proton/Briz-M | MexSat-1 | Failure | Third stage failure anomaly. |
| 58 | December 5, 2015 | Soyuz-2.1v/ Volga | Kanopus ST KYuA 1 |
Partial Failure | Primary payload Kanopus ST remained attached to upper stage, later burned up in atmosphere. Secondary payload KYuA 1 deployed successfully. |
| 59 | December 1, 2016 | Soyuz U | Progress MS-04 | Failure | Third stage failure. Progress supply ship burned up in atmosphere. |
| 60 | November 28, 2017 | Soyuz 2-1b | Meteor-M 2-1, 18 CubeSats | Failure | Fregat upper stage failure. |
I’ve included some launches of some boosters such as Zenit and Dnepr boosters that were not totally Russian. Sea Launch uses boosters composed of Ukrainian and Russian elements. Until 2010, Sea Launch was owned by a consortium of Russian, Ukrainian, American and Norwegian partners. Since then, Sea Launch has been majority owned by Russian companies.
Part of the reason they’ve had so many failures is that historically, the Soviet and Russian space programs have tended to launch more times than any of the world’s space powers. When you figure that a certain percentage of all boosters will fail in some way, then you end up with a relatively high number.
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the space program spread across three countries. Russia retained the majority of the production capacity while most of the rest was in Ukraine. The principle spaceport, Baikonur, ended up in the new nation of Kazakhstan.
The chaotic transition to a market economy in the 1990’s also left Russia’s space program in dire straits. Although Russian rockets became competitive in the satellite launch market, there was a serious lack of investment by the federal government in upgrading facilities and developing new space technologies.
Russian dominance in the launch market has been challenged in recent years due to failures, quality control problems, and the rise of SpaceX. Russia finished third in launches in 2016 with only 19 behind the United States and China. Russia improved its total to 21 in 2017, which was still low by historical standards.
49 responses to “Russian Launch Failures Aren’t a Bug, They’re a Feature”
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Sufferin’ succotash ?
Interesting, given how reliable their RD-180 is.
Well, the next question is, what’s their failure *rate*? And then how does that compare with the rest of the industry?
Has their failure rate been getting worse recently?
Also, does the insurance industry charge more to insure Russian launches compared to coverage for launches from other sources?
The failure rate of anything depends upon what baseline interval is being considered. But the recent Russian failure rate/yr. is higher. Of Russia’s significant competitors, only SpaceX has had any failures at all in recent years. Russia had three failures in 2015; SpaceX had one. Russia and SpaceX had one failure each in 2016. Russia had one failure in 2017; SpaceX had none.
Even shortening the interval to include only Russian failures since SpaceX’s CRS-7 accident, Russia has had three to SpaceX’s total of two. If one pushes the comparison interval back to SpaceX’s first launch of Falcon 9, things swing lopsidedly further against Russia. That is also true even if one goes far enough back to include all SpaceX’s Falcon 1 failures as well.
Has Russia’s failure rate/yr. been getting worse? It got a lot worse from 2011 through 2015. Since then, it seems to have moved back toward “normal.” But the failure-per-launch rate is probably still higher than the pre-2011 norm as Russia has been doing fewer launches these past few years than it typically did earlier and still suffering one or two failures per year.
Are Russian launches more expensive to insure? Yes.
Ariene also had a pretty major partial failure recently however with SpaceX the failures aren’t programmatic, and are considered “teething pains” Amos 6 for instance was something no one on the planet knew could happen, y
The recent Ariane misadventure just illustrates that there can be weak spots even in long-used procedures that can rear up and bite one even long after all their bugs have presumably been worked out. Ariane 5 had two complete failures and two partials among its first 14 missions. Like SpaceX after both its failures, ArianeSpace fixed its problems and its enviably long string of subsequent successes has been the result. SpaceX, ULA and Ariane Group (as it is now) have proven able to maintain a very high-quality level of execution in their operations. The Russians have not.
Yup the important thing isn’t not failing, it’s not having the same sort of failure twice.
Hmm. I guess I didn’t word that right (or at least not very well). What I meant by “failure rate” was, since Russia used to launch so many more rockets than the US per year, the percentage of failures per 100 launches (extrapolated, if necessary).
In other words, if the US launched 25 rockets and lost 1 in a year, and Russia launched 75 and lost 3, then they weren’t necessarily doing any worse even though Russia had more flight failures (in this made up scenario).
As an aside to that, low flight rates might yield 100% success but fail to reveal major issues.
Anyway, I’m not saying Russian launches are so great or anything, I’m just wondering whether, given the greater number of launches they used to do every year, their failure totals are actually as big an issue as they might appear to be
The insurance companies seem to unanimously agree that the Russian failure rate is significantly worse than those of their competitors.
If you have the time, you could compile your own table of Russian failure rates per year, per 100 launches or using any other metric you think appropriate. Wikipedia probably has lists of Soviet and Russian rocket launches that could provide raw data for such an exercise. I have neither sufficient interest nor time to do such a thing myself.
It isn’t just failure rate, it’s how they respond to it, qa, culture, the maturity of the rocket at time of failure, type of failure and so on. Overall isn’t considered as much, overall Soyuz has a better record than F9 for instance, however a lot of that is from when the people building the rockets had a lot more pride in it, their equipment was newer and in better shape and QA was tighter on all vehicles, not just the ones that were to carry crew.
Thanks for the table, Doug. I think this falls under what Lucy Van Pelt used to call, “things you might as well know now for your own good.”
I worked with the Russians a lot during the Mir program (astronauts flying in Soyuz) as well as Shuttle/Mir and ISS. They talked constantly about using simple, rugged, reliable systems. Certainly the Shuttle was a far far more capable=complex system than the Soyuz as one example.
Don’t they also state that their rockets are simpler and more rugged? They make incremental changes instead of a quantum changes like we make. Their failure rate should be near zero if their systems are that reliable.
And yet they aren’t. As the saying goes, it’s hard to make things foolproof when fools are so inventive.
I thought the saying was you can’t create something to be fool proof because nature just creates better fools
“Nothing is foolproof to a sufficiently talented fool”.
Many other versions of this saying exist.
When your hardware is single use, manufacturing issues will cause “infant mortality” problems that simply cannot be avoided. The Russians just seem to have more “infant mortality” problems than they should.
Much of the problems that the Russians experience have to do with manufacturing. While the designs don’t change (much), manufacturing issues seem to keep cropping up over time. For example, contamination of tanks, plumbing, or engines seems to be a reoccurring problem.
Yes, and all are generally associated with poor morale and quality control issues with the production line. As the old Russia joke goes “They pretend to pay us, we pretend to work”
https://www.economist.com/n…
A good classic article from the 1990’s on the failure of western methods to become established in the Russian economy that explains why the Russian space program is not much different than the Soviet space program was.
Great table, Doug. Do you also know offhand (or can easily generate) how many launches Russia attempted in each of the covered years? That would be interesting to know, so we could calculate failure rates. I suspect the failure rate per 100 launches has gone up, not down.
Not surprising. When you have a program that is under funded, with poorly paid and motivated workers, using old technology and is run by Kremlin appointees who consider skimming off a few Rubles as part of their pay. Really its what you would expect of socialist enterprise.
What is surprising is they haven’t killed any Cosmonauts since 1971. Just blind luck probably. But its amazing that NASA thinks the Soyuz is safer that SpaceX’s Dragon2.
In terms of the robotic exploration their record its even worst. As far as I recall they have never gotten any mission to successfully work at Mars, they had a few successes on the Moon decades ago, and a couple successes with Venus decades ago.
But Thomas, leadership is all about skimming. Why are you offended at government skimming when the whole system you put forward is predicated on skimming? The skimmers you teach kids to advocate for do it in private, and have no public disclosure requirements, and they control or try to control any press coverage in a very soviet manner. They even practice the same secrecy methods by making heavy use of NDA and secrecy contracts. Yes, the Russians have a big problem with leadership taking more than their due from the enterprise they run. But isn’t that a problem in the corporate world as well? Or do you consider it not a problem because it’s a feature of the system? If you want to dig far enough into Soviet cannon, you’ll find that the vanguard of the proletariat are entitled to rewards for being the elite that they are. Surely you don’t have just a selective eye for the corruption of your enemies, while ignoring the corruption of your own camp.
Private firms are governed by their board of directors and ultimately their shareholders who determine the pay of the employees. I am not sure what you mean by “skimming” since in the business world embezzlement or misuse of funds will quickly get you fired or in jail.
In a market system, if some executives make more than others it is because the Board of Directors consider them to be worth it, just as sports stars make more because the teams that sign them consider them to be worth it. What is going on in Russia is not based on a free market system, but is even against their written rules.
If you actually read about how communist economies work I think you’d be surprised at how market based they were as well. It’s just that the control over resources and people was more lumpy with super concentrations of authority and a vast underworld that grew out of those super concentrations of authority. And like your board of directors approving the compensation of officers in charge of the enterprise, I assure you the equivalent is true for tin pot dictators and Russian style kleptrocrats. It’s all legal, and approved by the relevant governing bodies. So the logic you apply to corporations also applies to foreign governments.
Communist economies replace the role of market decision making with decision by committees, with often no one regulating the committees. They are not market based by definition. Market base means the mass market uses price to make decisions.
Firms in the U.S. are regulated by the S.E.C, stock holder groups and ultimately the market when bad decisions make them bankrupt. Toys R Us is the latest example. There are no such controls in a communist economy, short of a public uprising or a change of leadership.
Price isn’t the only deciding factor, there are always considerations over “Penny-wise, pound-foolish” but that is also effectively price, more now or more later.
Yeah, that’s what your textbooks say. A second order reading of how industry worked in the USSR, and how it works today in Russia says otherwise. They had a sort of market dynamic as you describe and it was the underworld that tied it all together. There’s no escaping market forces in an economy it’s human nature. But that avoids the main issue of leadership overcompensating themselves. Some systems deal with it better than others. But it’s my reading that overcompensation is the function economies were built to enable, everything else is secondary.
But your assumption that a executive in a private firm are overcompensating themselves is subjective and not based on the labor market. Using sports as an example there is only one Michael Jordan, so if you want your team to win the playoffs you will pay his price.
Yes, black Markets exist, but they are not part of the system.
You’re right, it’s subjective. But this subject is by its very nature subjective. I think the solution is a balance of forces. Unions were a good real world solution to the subjective nature of the problem. And the laboratory of history shows that when corporate boards were counterbalanced by labor unions the nation did swimmingly good, and that the downturn of the US economy, education base, and quality of people in general correlates with the increase in freedom corporate boards achieved starting in the 80’s.
As for black markets in the Soviet bloc. I love it when you misunderstand something because you don’t know the history, but your theoretical underpinnings allow you to make my point as you try to state a counter factual. You’d really love reading about applied Soviet economics. Nothing moved without the mafia. Not one lump of coal, not one boxcar of iron ore. They were the system. The trick of Soviet economics was how to move resources without use of money. Why would a mine boss who had a pile of coke ship it a iron foundry in Moscow? Why not ship it to another factory? What was their currency? And who were the enforcers? Why would a train operator move the material, and how could he convince a machine tool plant to get him parts? It’s a fascinating history.
So? The same was also true for the Port of New York in its heyday in the 1930’s and 1940’s. Indeed, the U.S. Navy cut a deal with the mafia during WWII to keep the harbors around NY safe. As a result there were no real problems from sabotage, the mafia took care of it in its own way and the Navy didn’t ask any questions. The mafia was also involved in many of the older urban industrial areas and the increased costs that resulted for business was one reason firms relocated to the rural south and western U.S., to lower costs from the type of underground transactions you discuss.
http://warfarehistorynetwor…
But in secretive centrally planned ones like the Soviet Union its easier for them to take root by paying off officals. That is why underground economies existed to a greater extent there.
But we are also dealing with the problem of worker motivation. Workers at SpaceX have the financial motivation of stock options and bonuses to perform. What do the workers in Russia have as incentives? Indeed, as the Russian economy failed the inflation eroded most of their salaries and nothing really replaced it. Getting a plaque to put on the wall for being a good worker is nice, but doesn’t put food on the table for the worker.
For public traded corporations the compensation for executives is reported to the S.E.C, which publishes it on their website. Its not as secretive as in Russia. And skimming is looked for by auditors and regulators, so corruption is minimal in public traded firms, and when found the firms usually suffer – think Enron.
Unions lost power because the nature of work changed to require more education and they failed to change with it and to deliver the same benefits as they did when the economy was more industrial. Also many unions ended up being involved with the mafia types you mention.
I was raised in the Chicago area and my father was a truck driver for 40 years and a member of the Teamsters. He was always sadden about how the union management went from serving its members to serving itself when the mafia types came in. This was also a factor in the decline of many unions.
http://articles.chicagotrib…
https://themobmuseum.org/bl…
Our system is the way it is to keep engineers and companies employed. Part of that is domestically political (example:SLS) The other is security. We keep the rocket guys employed they don’t go work for other people.
As is the rest of the worlds power blocs. Russia, the EU, China, India, Japan. It’s no different.
Yes, NASA is a good example of where market forces are replaced by Congress in keeping pork projects like the SLS going.
Not always, NASA and USAF are adopting more and more COTS style programs because market forces work, and in actuality COTS based is a good hybrid of traditional contracting and market decided contracts with cost plus being replaced by the more market beneficial and cost effective firm fixed-price contracts. I will be the first to concede there are times cost plus makes sense but they are the exception not the rule and it should always be used as the exception in contracts.
” But isn’t that a problem in the corporate world as well? Or do you
consider it not a problem because it’s a feature of the system?”
In the market is negative feedback that catches up to a group that is too tolerant of high agency costs. In government, we have, …. nothing short of the death of the republic for some of these professional politicians.
James Oberg did some very interesting reporting on Soyuz the spacecraft and Soyuz the launcher back when NASA was working towards flying US astronauts in/on Soyuz. It was quite enlightening. Since then, Russia has had some relatively close calls with Soyuz and Progress (which shares a lot of systems with Soyuz). It’s quite scary really.
Yes, just as with the Shuttle NASA is playing Technology Russian Roulette with both the ISS and Soyuz. Let’s hope they keep winning.
That’s why CCP safety requirements are so high, that and because the hope is that the vehicles will be flying non government employees, fortunately they seem on track for early -mid 2019 so a few more Soyuz is all we have to deal with
Yes, one very low standard for Russia, one very high standard for American firms. And NASA, Apollo1, Challenger and Columbia shows NASA doesn’t always follow even its lax rules.
Apollo 1 we were over eager, and were still learning, Challenger and Columbia were more programmatic.
Challenger and Columbia both happened because the shuttle was allowed to keep flying even though it was encountering problems it wasn’t designed for. The Challenger issue was that the SRB o-rings weren’t designed to be exposed to hot combustion gasses (even though it was happening with increasing regularity due to changes in the leak check pressure). The Columbia issue was that the fragile orbiter TPS simply wasn’t designed to be impacted by chunks of foam falling off the ET (which happened on every single space shuttle flight to some degree).
As i said they were programmatic. And the designs of Dragon 2 (with F9), Starliner and bfr are inherently safer, yes Starliner will require srbs but outside of case rupture they shouldn’t be a problem, not having solids helps the other two as does protected and durable TPS, and no foam to hit said TPS
Soyuz has flown so many times that most all the bugs have had time to show themselves. They do still teak the design here and there.
Their big problem?
ALL their Chief Designers (of any account) are long dead.
Their forceful personalities were part of the propellant mix
Thanks for summarizing this in an easily readable form. Yea, the Russians are not as good in the launch reliability department as they should be given their extensive experience.
Hard to be competitive and reliable when corrupt and drunk
This comment is unintentionally more hilarious a half year later with Elon Musk of SpaceX.
Failures is a feature on all launch vehicles…. try statistics. Russian tends to launch a lot more rockets than we do.
Yes, they do. But does NASA/dod blow up 1 or more a year?
And did/does Russia launch that many more?
Not lately.
We keep annoying the Russians with disparagement, boycotts and criticisms, they may decide to show America that they can use their nukes to kill millions.
I don’t know, it looks like he has more serious political problems at the moment than the U.S. as the Russians are getting restless again.
http://www.bbc.com/news/av/…
Russia fire: Calls for Putin to resign
“Thousands of people have taken to the streets in the Siberian city of Kemerovo, angry at Russian officials over the leisure complex fire that killed at least 64 people.”
There is going to be a lot more protests unless oil prices rise. As long as they stay this low, Russia is losing money on a daily basis.