FAA AST Responds to NTSB Recommendations in SpaceShipTwo Accident Report

SpaceShipTwo’s right boom. (Credit: NTSB)

The Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA AST) has submitted formal responses to the eight recommendations the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made in its report on the loss of SpaceShipTwo in October 2014.

All the responses are dated Oct. 30, 2015 — one day short of the one year anniversary of the crash. The responses are all identified as being from FAA Administrator Michael P. Huerta.

The recommendations and responses are reproduced below. The responses are long, single paragraphs that can be difficult to read. So I have broken them up into paragraphs in order to assist Parabolic Arc’s readers.

I’ve also added notes updating the status on the regulatory moratorium (aka, learning period) and FAA AST’s research program.

NTSB RECOMMENDATION

In collaboration with the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, develop and issue human factors guidance for operators to use throughout the design and operation of a crewed vehicle. The guidance should address, but not be limited to, the human factors issues identified during the SpaceShipTwo accident investigation.

FAA RESPONSE

Under the provisions of the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) (Public Law 98-575), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates commercial space transportation (CST) to protect the public health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In amending the CSLA in 2004, Congress placed a moratorium that prohibited the FAA from issuing regulations that protect occupant safety.

In crafting the moratorium and the “learning period” that it represents for industry, Congress also tasked the FAA to “encourage, facilitate, and promote the continuous improvement of the safety of launch vehicles designed to carry humans.” The moratorium, which was extended in 2015, is slated to expire on March 31 , 2016. However, both the House and Senate have passed bills in 2015 that would extend the moratorium by 5 to 10 years, and the negotiated bill language between the two Chambers extends the moratorium by 8 years. [Editor’s Note: the 8 year extension has been signed into law.] The FAA takes both the moratorium and the direction to encourage, facilitate, and promote continuous occupant safety improvements seriously, and these considerations factor heavily into our response to this recommendation.

In recognition of our authorized public safety mission and our responsibility to encourage, facilitate, and promote continuous occupant safety improvements for emerging commercial human space transportation vehicles and their operations, in August 2014, the FAA issued the “Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant Safety” guidance document to provide an overview of best practice considerations that the FAA believes are important for the commercial space industry. This document is available at the following website: https://www.faa.gov/about/office org/headquarters offices/ast/media/Recommended Practices_ for_ HSF Occupant_ Safety-Version 1-TC 14-003 7. pdf

These best practice considerations are based on decades of U.S. and international experience in human space flight and vehicle design. The recommended practices are general in nature and do not lay out a prescriptive approach for occupant safety. The FAA believes that they form an excellent starting point for the development of consensus industry standards. For example, in considering inadvertent crew actions, the recommendation that “no single inadvertent flight crew or ground controller action should result in an event causing serious injuries to occupants,” and its supporting rationale could serve as a springboard for developing a coordinated response to this recommendation between industry and the FAA.

The FAA agrees with this recommendation, and has reached out to the Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) discussing a plan to develop a coordinated response. We will continue to engage the CSF and its members over the coming months.

NTSB RECOMMENDATION

Implement steps in your evaluation of experimental permit applications to ensure that applicants have (1) identified single flight crew tasks that, if performed incorrectly or at the wrong time, could result in a catastrophic hazard, (2) assessed the reasonableness, including human factor considerations, of the proposed mitigations to prevent errors that could result from performing those tasks, and (3)fully documented the rationale used to justify related assumptions in the hazard analysis required by 14 Code of Federal Regulations 437.55.

FAA RESPONSE

The FAA is examining our response to this recommendation with an emphasis on our public safety-related regulations and guidance. We have an active rulemaking project to rewrite our experimental permit regulations in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 437, due to difficulties in application of the first generation rule, particularly in the hazard analysis requirements. We also are initiating a review of our human factors regulations in 14 CFR Part 460, as well as its related guidance. Our expectation is that, at a minimum, our guidance will be updated and improved. The part 460 regulations may also be updated if we determine this is necessary.

All of these regulatory efforts will address the three elements identified in this recommendation. In addition to our regulatory efforts, the FAA’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President’s Budget Request proposes to establish a CST safety research budget line. If Congress funds this important research portfolio, the FAA intends to launch a research and development project focused on identifying best practice considerations for crew human factors for small winged commercial space flight vehicles. This research project will be instrumental in informing the development of consensus standards and improved regulations and guidance.

[Editor’s Note: FAA PAO says: “The FAA received $2M for the conduct of our full commercial space research program in FY16.  We are still in the process of allocating this funding to individual projects.”]

NTSB RECOMMENDATION

Develop a process to determine whether an experimental permit applicant has demonstrated the adequacy of existing mitigations to ensure public health and safety as well as safety of property before granting a waiver from the human error hazard analysis requirements of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 437.55.

FAA RESPONSE

The FAA may only issue waivers to the regulatory requirements for CST licenses and permits if the FAA determines that public safety is protected and that the waiver is in the public’s interest. Within the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), the Licensing and Evaluation Division and the Safety Inspection Division (SID) have defined new working arrangements to ensure that the contents (provisions or mitigations) of waivers are identified and transitioned as appropriate into respective safety inspection plans. Also, to identify additional unknown issues, special conditions, or mitigations, the SID will query all AST divisions for any outstanding or specific items that may require monitoring or verification during its safety inspection pre-brief meeting, which is conducted prior to safety monitoring.

The SID has added a step to review and record such topics into the pre-existing pre-inspection checklist discussed during the meeting. This allows safety inspectors (SIs) to readily include applicable verifications into the safety inspection plan. These revised working arrangements will be described and added to the Safety Inspection Processes and Procedures document (P-008), and they will also be incorporated into our P-008 training course over the coming months.

It is important to note that the waiver issued to Scaled Composites for SpaceShipTwo was a direct result of the FAA’s inability to issue an equivalent level of safety finding under the provisions of part 437. Scaled Composites applied the methods associated with transport airplane system safety certification to its experimental permit hazard analysis, and the FAA considered this analysis to be sufficiently rigorous to protect public safety. However, unlike parts 415 and 417 for launch licensing, part 43 7 does not include the ability to incorporate an equivalent level of safety finding. This made a waiver necessary.

The FAA is engaged in rulemaking that will extend its ability to make equivalent level of safety findings, which is a critical need due to the diverse range of products and concepts that are emerging in the commercial space flight industry.

NTSB RECOMMENDATION

Develop and implement procedures and guidance for confirming that commercial space operators are implementing the mitigations identified in a safety-related waiver of federal regulations and work with the operators to determine the effectiveness of those mitigations that correspond to hazards contributing to catastrophic outcomes.

FAA RESPONSE

The FAA may only issue waivers to the regulatory requirements for CST licenses and permits if the FAA determines that public safety is protected and that the waiver is in the public’s interest. Within the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), the Licensing and Evaluation Division and the Safety Inspection Division (SID) have defined new working arrangements to ensure that the contents (provisions or mitigations) of waivers are identified and transitioned as appropriate into respective safety inspection plans. Also, to identify additional unknown issues, special conditions, or mitigations, the SID will query all AST divisions for any outstanding or specific items that may require monitoring or verification during its safety inspection pre-brief meeting, which is conducted prior to safety monitoring.

The SID has added a step to review and record such topics into the pre-existing pre-inspection checklist discussed during the meeting. This allows safety inspectors (Sis) to readily include applicable verifications into the safety inspection plan. These revised working arrangements will be described and added to the Safety Inspection Processes and Procedures document (P-008), and they will also be incorporated into our P-008 training course over the coming months.

It is important to note that the waiver issued to Scaled Composites for SpaceShipTwo was a direct result of the FAA’s inability to issue an equivalent level of safety finding under the provisions of part 437. Scaled Composites applied the methods associated with transport airplane system safety certification to its experimental permit hazard analysis, and the FAA considered this analysis to be sufficiently rigorous to protect public safety. However, unlike parts 415 and 417 for launch licensing, part 43 7 does not include the ability to incorporate an equivalent level of safety finding. This made a waiver necessary.

The FAA is engaged in rulemaking that will extend its ability to make equivalent level of safety findings, which is a critical need due to the diverse range of products and concepts that are emerging in the commercial space flight industry.

NTSB RECOMMENDATION

Develop and issue guidance for experimental permit applicants that (1) includes the information in Advisory Circular 413-1, “License Application Procedures,” and(2) encourages commercial space vehicle manufacturers to begin the consultation process with the Office of Commercial Space Transportation during a vehicle’s design phase.

FAA RESPONSE

The FAA agrees that an early and robust pre-application consultation process is beneficial to both the applicant and the FAA. Robust pre-application consultation provides an opportunity to highlight novel and unique features of a new vehicle or its operational concepts, and it ensures the applicant has the guidance and clarification necessary to submit a complete application that meets the associated regulations.

As a component of its September 2014 business plan, AST issued an internal procedure to guide its staff in the conduct of pre-application consultation with potential applicants for licenses, safety approvals, and experimental permits. Procedure P-01 1, Pre-application Consultation Process, was completed in March 2015 and shared with Board staff during the course of the investigation.

The FAA conducts pre-application consultation with prospective applicants to enable a more effective and complete application. Pre-application consultation is a series of meetings and information exchanges appropriately seeped and executed based on the maturity and understanding of the prospective applicant and the unique features of the proposed application.

Pre-application consultations are conducted through specific stages designed to allow both the applicant and the FAA to gain a mutual understanding of the proposed vehicle and its operation, enable the applicant to gain a thorough understanding of the applicable CST regulations and their associated policies and acceptable means of compliance, and to identify and resolve any other potential issues that could affect the applicant’s ability to develop a license or experimental permit application that can be accepted for review.

Additionally, in an effort to facilitate a more efficient review, evaluation, and approval process, AST has developed checklists as a supplement to the pre-application process. These checklists are available to assist applicants in developing a comprehensive, compliant, and complete application for FAA review and approval. The organizational format of the checklists is specifically intended to facilitate a rapid, efficient summary of the applicable regulatory requirements with the corresponding means of compliance that will be used by the applicant.

Further, the FAA has reviewed all CST regulatory guidance material, including Advisory Circular (AC) 413-1 , “License Application Procedures,” for currency and completeness and has developed a prioritized plan for revising these documents.

The FAA intends to use the framework of the pre-application consultation procedure, with references to the checklists and other guidance material, as the basis for issuing a new AC that will replace AC 413-1. This new AC will outline a means, but not the only means, of compliance with § 4 13 .5, Pre-application Consultation, and we have included this in our 2016 business plan. With the updated guidance materials, checklists, and the pre-application consultation procedures, the FAA is in a position to offer a more robust, early pre-application consultation.

NTSB RECOMMENDATION

Develop and implement a program for Office of Commercial Space Transportation inspectors that aligns them with individual operators applying for an experimental permit or a launch license to ensure that the inspectors have adequate time to become familiar with the technical, operational, training, and management controls that they will inspect.

FAA RESPONSE

We understand the Board’s intent and expectation of benefits, such as improved knowledge of individual operators and their vehicles, by aligning a dedicated SI to a specific launch operator and all of their subsequent operations.

Because of these potential benefits, AST initiated an approach in 2012 to assign a dedicated SI to support each individual program at the inception of each license and permit application, beginning in the pre-application process phase. That same SI continues engagement through the completion of the application evaluation in order to provide appropriate input and feedback to both the operator and the FAA’s evaluation team, while they are also learning and capturing all pertinent inspectable operational items, mitigations, and special terms and conditions associated with a specific operator’s planned activities and processes.

This approach is now institutionalized in our respective internal procedures documents: P-0 11, which governs pre-application coordination, and P-002, for license and permit application review and issuance. The SI assigned to each evaluation program incorporates all applicable inspectable items into a comprehensive safety inspection plan, which other SIs employ to verify compliance once inspections begin for that operator. We also review these safety inspection plans following the completion of each launch or reentry inspection campaign to discuss and identify lessons learned and modify the safety inspection plan where needed. This approach allows any SI to monitor any licensed or permitted operation, verify operator compliance, and ensure public safety consistent with authorizing statutes and the CST regulations.

While assigning specific SIs to each operators’ program(s) works over the course of an extensive pre-application coordination and evaluation review, the FAA does not believe it is feasible in an operational environment, nor is it necessarily desirable given the public safety aspects of space launch operations and the dynamic nature of the CST industry. Specifically, our concerns are in three primary areas: the size of the credentialed SI workforce, the dynamic nature of launch operations scheduling, and the central role of launch sites in the public safety aspects of CST operations.

AST’s SI Workforce AST is a small organization (81 full time positions in FY 20 15), with only 14 credentialed SIs distributed across three field offices and headquarters. The FAA believes that we must ensure that all SIs have familiarity with a number of different launch/reentry vehicle systems and operators. Each launch/reentry system has different configurations and processes and many operators employ more than one launch vehicle system.

However, the overall engineering aspects, propulsion concepts, flight safety systems, and inspection approaches among launch operators (suborbital, expendable, reusable, etc.) remain similar while presenting unique countdown challenges related to public safety. Issues that occur in one program often may have implications to another (e.g., a flight safety system issue), and therefore are more easily identifiable through inspection for those SIs who have monitored different operators and different launch vehicles.

We have found that in our unique industry, exposing SIs to different operators, and launch and reentry vehicle systems, allows them to become better, more well-rounded in their inspection duties, and capable of responding to a number of real-time safety challenges during critical launch countdown operations.

Inspection Scheduling Challenges

In FY 2014, AST conducted 223 safety inspections in 12 different locations for 19 licensed and permitted flights/reentries. However, only three of these locations had a permanent, dedicated inspection field office, which allowed for rapid response to dynamic rescheduling of operational procedures which required safety inspection monitoring.

The SIs are assigned as needed to conduct inspection activities for all programs under FAA oversight. The nature of today’s CST industry often requires different inspections for various programs to be conducted simultaneously in areas around the country. In fact, it is not unusual for CST operations to now be planned or conducted nearly simultaneously at different sites around the country.

‘Also, the exact nature of CST safety inspection activities varies significantly from the historical FAA’s aviation safety inspection model in authority, activity type, and frequency. All regulated launch and reentry activities that can affect public safety require safety inspection and occur at all phases of operation (preflight, flight, and post flight). All safety inspections correspond to components, systems, and procedures which are safety critical due to their impact on public safety.

A majority of the inspection activities are extremely dynamic in nature with quick call-ups and sudden reschedules based on a launch/reentry operator’s schedule. A majority of these activities may also slip over extended periods of time, further requiring a flexible distribution of manpower resources. In addition, duty time and crew rest concerns must also be addressed if we are to ensure that Sis can safely conduct their mission.

For example, a specific expendable launch vehicle operation at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station may comprise 20 or more safety inspections that occur over all phases of a launch campaign. The preflight activities associated with that given launch campaign often occur simultaneously or back to back on consecutive shifts and consecutive days. No single SI aligned to a specific operator can observe all of these activities without violating crew rest requirements and impacting the SI’s personal safety and ability to properly monitor. In addition, that same operator may be planning or conducting operations simultaneously at another site in an entirely different region of the country.

Fundamentally, limiting AST’s ability to schedule only certain SIs assigned to specific operators and their flight vehicles would create a logistical impossibility for the FAA to conduct all of its necessary inspections.

Launch Site Aspects of Public Safety

The specific features of launch sites and their surroundings are central to the safety of the public and their property. These considerations are integral to the FAA’ s licensing and experimental permitting evaluations, determinations, and safety oversight.

The FAA believes that the most effective way to distribute its SI workforce is to base them in the vicinity where operations will occur. Since the majority of FAA licensed operations still continue to occur at or near the major federal launch ranges, SI field offices are located at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida (1 Field Manager and 3 SIs); Vandenberg Air Force Base, California (1 SI); and Wallops Flight Facility, Virginia (1 SI). In addition, the FAA maintains an SI workforce in its headquarters in Washington, DC (1 Division Manager and 7 SIs).

We have found a number of benefits occur by basing our SIs in field locations. First, the scheduling and response benefits, which were discussed earlier, are clear. However, the benefits extend to other areas. Both the FAA and our Federal partners benefit by the closer coordination, information flow and sharing of knowledge that is enabled. Also, and perhaps more significantly, our SIs are able to understand the unique aspects of operations in and around these operational sites. As a result they are more tuned to specific issues that could arise for operations at these sites, regardless of the operator.

Because of these benefits the FAA expects to continue to align our geographic field offices and SIs to high-activity launch sites, and we will consider adding new field office locations as warranted by CST developments. I believe the FAA has effectively addressed Safety Recommendation A-15-24 and consider our actions complete.

NTSB RECOMMENDATION

Direct Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) management to work with AST technical staff to (1) develop clearer policies, practices, and procedures that allow direct communications between staff and applicants, (2) provide clearer guidance on evaluating commercial space transportation permits, waivers, and licenses, and (3) better define the line between the information needed to ensure public safety and the information pertaining more broadly to ensuring mission success.

FAA RESPONSE

AST technical staff members have always been, and will continue to be, engaged in direct communications with applicants on technical matters. However, the FAA has recognized the need to improve the guidance and policy provided for our technical staff.

As a result, the FAA has taken steps to clarify and improve communications among the staff, management, and applicants during the permit and licensing evaluation process. Upgrades to AST’s procedures were completed in accordance with AST’s September 2014 business plan.

Under this plan, AST developed and issued in March 201 5 a new internal operating procedures document, P-0 11 , covering pre-application coordination with prospective applicants. AST also revised and consolidated its internal procedures for conducting reviews and issuing licenses and experimental permits with the release of P-002 in August 2015.

Each of these procedures provides comprehensive guidance for:

• The composition, management, and responsibilities of AST teams working in these areas, including such areas as coordination and communications within the team and with the applicant;
• Defining the statutory basis and conducting licensing and permit evaluations in accordance with the CST regulations and their associated FAA guidance and policy; and
• Resolution of technical issues within the team, and the elevation of these issues to AST management if they cannot be resolved at the team level.

Elevation to management is also required in cases where waivers, equivalent levels of safety, or the existing regulations, guidance or policy may not be sufficient due to novel aspects of proposed vehicle or its operations.

AST uses a Management Review Board (MRB) process when making license or permit determinations, including the need for any waivers or equivalent levels of safety findings. The MRB is made up of AST’s executive leadership, its division managers, and chief engineer. MRB meetings are open to all AST staff members and all AST staff and management are actively encouraged to raise any concerns associated with the license or permit review during MRB meetings.

It is critical that all AST staff members understand the FAA’s statutory authority is limited to the protection of public safety and property, national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

To support this need, AST is also conducting a comprehensive upgrade of its Safety Management System (SMS) process to more clearly articulate our safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion within the context of our legislative authority and regulatory framework for CST.

The upgrade will also clarify the roles and responsibilities of AST’s management and staff in accordance with the recent improvements to AST operating practices and lessons learned. All AST personnel will receive training on the upgraded SMS. The revised SMS document and the training package are both targeted to be available by the beginning of Calendar Year 2016.

NTSB RECOMMENDATION

In collaboration with the commercial space flight industry, continue work to implement a database of lessons learned from commercial space mishap investigations and encourage commercial space industry members to voluntarily submit lessons learned.

FAA RESPONSE

The FAA supports this recommendation. The FAA takes both the CSLA moratorium, as described in our response to Safety Recommendation A-15-19, and the direction to encourage, facilitate, and promote continuous occupant safety improvements seriously.

Recognizing the profound impact that voluntary safety data sharing has had in aviation, the FAA believes that facilitating an appropriate framework for voluntary safety data sharing can also bring significant continuous safety improvements to the emerging commercial human space flight operations.

However, the FAA also recognizes that it will likely take a number of years to implement such a framework. As a component of its September 2014 business plan, the FAA performed an internal feasibility study for voluntary safety data sharing between industry members and the FAA. The study examined cooperative data sharing in the aviation industry to identify critical enablers and lessons learned for implementation.

The results of that study, completed in August 2015, highlight several challenges that will need to be addressed. These include de-identification and protection of proprietary data, creating a non-punitive environment for voluntary disclosure of safety information, and ensuring the availability of data mining and analysis tools to proactively identify emerging safety issues and lessons learned. These challenges are compounded by the limited amount of operators, operations, and data that will be available in the emerging human CST industry.

However, the FAA believes that the nascent nature of this industry also offers the potential to establish such a framework while it is in its formative stages, and we intend to work closely with the industry to mature the concepts and plans outlined below as we pursue its implementation. The study recommended a stepped approach to addressing these challenges, including first examining the modifications to existing tools for data collection, mining, and analysis capabilities.

As mentioned in our response to Safety Recommendation A-15-20, the FAA’s FY 2016 President’s Budget Request proposes to establish a CST safety research budget line. Within the associated portfolio, the FAA intends to conduct research to examine extending the tools developed for voluntarily sharing and mining aviation safety data to commercial human spaceflight operations, so that advanced space flight data mining capabilities could inform safety assessments and identify emerging safety issues and lessons learned.

Over recent years the FAA has developed a number of tools to enable aviation industry-FAA sharing and analysis of voluntarily submitted operational safety data to enable operators individually, and the industry and FAA collectively, to identify early precursors to accidents and take proactive action. This research task would explore the ability of AST and the CST industry to leverage these tools and extend their applicability to CST operations.

Next, AST will encourage internal company-sponsored SMSs that leverage non-punitive voluntary reporting by flight crews and operational staff, along with the collection and analysis of detailed operational data.

Cooperative programs could be structured that are analogous to aviation Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP). FOQA-type programs use the data collected from each flight, and then aggregate and analyze it to identify and review issues and trends that might only be evident over several flights, while ASAP relies primarily on individuals to identify confusion, errors, or other similar issues that could lead to safety consequences.

As was the case with aviation, legislative protections may be required to fully implement the non-punitive environment needed to support these types of programs and the sharing of this type of information with the FAA and others in the industry.

The FAA intends to work with Congress as necessary to facilitate any protections that may be required and then flow these protections into the CST regulatory environment. AST will continue work on enabling a voluntary safety data sharing framework over the course of the next year, focusing on suborbital human CST by working closely with our industry stakeholders, collectively and individually, as we move forward.

We recently emphasized these issues at our October 2015 CST Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) meeting, and are fortunate to have our Annual FAA CST Conference in February 2016 and May 2016 COMSTAC meeting to further highlight these issues. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on these safety recommendations and provide an update by October 31, 2016.