NASA’s Muddled Message on Human Space Flight
I listened to most of the Congressional hearing today. Rather than getting into the specifics of what everyone said, let me comment on what I think the Obama Administration has been missing during the last three months: an ability to define and lay out on a clear message.
Obama’s policy is actually quite simple. It starts with the following basic reality, which the Augustine Committee pointed out with crystal clarity:
- Constellation is unaffordable under any realistic budget.
NASA needs to repeat this over and over again for it to sink in. Congress either has to accept that reality, or it must provide a massive boost in funding needed to make the program work. My guess is the money isn’t really.
If you accept that basic point, there are several clear alternatives:
- Four potential replacements for Ares I – Delta IV, Atlas V, Falcon 9, Taurus II
- Two rockets (Delta IV, Atlas V) with proven track records built by ULA – a company with 50 years of experience to draw upon
- Orbital Science’s Taurus II has not flown but is built by a proven company with decades of experience.
- Falcon 9 also has not flown but is built by a start-up — SpaceX — that has attracted some of the industry’s best engineers.
In short, we would be going from one unaffordable system to four potential options. NASA could conceivably choose one from Column A (Atlas V or Delta IV) and one from Column B (Taurus II or SpaceX), bringing the latter online gradually as it proves itself to be safe. Eventually, the United States would have multiple, redundant access to space – a capability that nobody else in the world would possess.
Now, there are questions and objections. First, ULA hasn’t committed to competing for the funding that will be made available. That’s true. But, there is probably a way to make it worth their while. If you’re worried about the safety of the other two unproven rockets, then why not spend the money needed to get them into the game for a capability NASA needs anyway?
Also, Bigelow Aerospace is looking at the Atlas V for use on its private space station. So, the interests of NASA and the private sector match rather well here. ULA could spread out its costs and risks, and get government funding to develop something it can use for commercial flights. If Bigelow’s project actually works, then the cost of building new stations could come down massively.
Then there are questions of booster costs. Would ULA’s costs be high? Yes. But, they’re proven rockets whose developments have already been paid for by the Air Force. Why not capitalize on that? These boosters could be brought on line rather quickly, minimizing the flight gap. And again, if you’re worried about the safety and reliability of the other two options, here’s your answer.
Are the alternatives from SpaceX and Orbital unproven? Of course. But, NASA has already helped to pay for their development under an existing program. The two companies also have their own monetary stakes in their development. The funding commitment is there at least through robotic cargo flights. Depending upon how well those work, NASA can decide on funding human variants. This phased approach minimizes risk.
The issue of subsidizing a commercial launch industry came up. Congressional reps were concerned about the possibility of companies going out of business and requiring bail outs.
These are legitimate fears based, in part, on the experiences of Lockheed Martin and Boeing in entering the commercial launch market. They found it difficult to compete, and formed a consortium – ULA – to build, market and launch their offerings. The Air Force has ended up subsidizing this effort because this is a national need to launch satellites into orbit. NASA has a similar need for access to orbit.
Subsidies are not that unusual in aerospace. It’s difficult to conceive that Arianespace would exist in its current form — or at all — without billions of dollars in support given to it over the years by European governments. Or Airbus, for that matter. ISRO has a commercial subsidiary that markets its launchers, all paid for Indian taxpayers.
The contradictory aspect here that while they express deep skepticism about the viability of new companies entering the market, critics are expecting them to be profitable on a purely commercial basis without any of the subsidies that existing companies have enjoyed. I’m not sure how fair or realistic that expectation is, frankly.
We won’t know precisely what the market is for orbital crew and cargo transport until SpaceX and Orbital get their systems online, Bigelow moves ahead with its plans, and we see whether other commercial facilities like Excalibur Almaz get built. The market could prove to be overstated. On the other hand, the estimates might be right on the mark.
Many of the arguments above were made during today’s hearing, but they seemed to be explained in bits and pieces. Many specifics questions were asked and details given, but the discussion too often descended into rather murky depths. There was not a clear theme to which advocates of the President’s policy were able to return to repeatedly in order to map out the big-picture choices that Congress faces.
I know I’m being hard on NASA, which is proposing a policy that I believe is largely sound. For the record, I don’t think many of the Senators particularly distinguished themselves today. But, I will leave that for another post.
11 responses to “NASA’s Muddled Message on Human Space Flight”
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Ok, I agree with your basic point that NASA isn’t clearly describing the road ahead, but I don’t think you do a better job by focusing on the commercial crew program. I know it was a matter of concern in the hearing today but it’s an entirely minimal part of the budget. So let’s go back to your basic reality:
1. Constellation is unaffordable under any realistic budget.
I would say it differently:
1a. Neither Constellation nor any significant space program using existing technology is affordable under the existing budget; and
2. There’s no more money.
So how will NASA go beyond LEO to explore space? The answer is: new technology. If you can’t afford to do things the old way, invent a new way that is affordable. So when people ask “Why are we delaying heavy lift for 5 years?” the answer is not to dodge the question by saying it might not be 5 years, like Bolden did today, the answer is to say “To figure out how to do it affordably.”
If NASA can’t come up with an affordable program, it’s astronauts won’t be going anywhere. That’s just reality, deal with it.
One of the strategies Constellation supporters use is to pick a piece of the new NASA proposal, and compare Constellation to that piece. The reality is that Constellation is being replaced with all sorts of less expensive efforts.
– commercial participation: The commercial crew services that would go to the Space Station that are often compared to Constellation (or at least the active parts of Constellation) are just one part of this. There are also more incentives for commercial cargo, use of commercial suborbital RLVs, commercially-friendly prize competitions, commercial involvement in technology, KSC upgrades that could be used by commercial vendors, and more.
– Space Station: The new plan makes sure the Space Station is finished through Shuttle contingency funds, declines to deorbit the Space Station in 2015, adds capabilities to the Space Station, funds the Orion super-lite CRV to support the station, funds actual use of the station, shrinks the gap to the station using the services already mentioned, and deploys general and exploration-specific technology demonstrations at the station.
– robotics: The new budget includes a boost to Planetary Science robotic missions (plus PU-238 production and more NEO searches), a large boost to traditional and “Venture-class” Earth observation missions, a new line of robotic astronaut precursor missions, and a large general space technology line where most of the technologies will probably apply to robotic missions and satellites.
– technology: In addition to the general technology item I just mentioned, there’s a large exploration technology demonstration line to lower exploration costs and boost exploration capabilities, and also a heavy lift/propulsion technology effort. Aeronautics technology also gets a partial revival.
There are also other miscellaneous items like infrastructure upgrades. None of it would have been possible under Constellation. In all likelihood Constellation would have ended up raiding much of what was left in the rest of NASA.
There is so much more activity than under the Constellation quagmire that it’s difficult to explain it all quickly.
Trent is closer to the point on this. Commercial crew is a big deal, but the over-arching issue is exploration beyond LEO. Where, when and how. NASA could really use some tutoring on how to convey their vision for this.
Also, in addition to the Atlas/Delta/Falcon/Taurus choice, Congress clearly wants to add a government-developed vehicle to the mix. I don’t think NASA or the Obama Administration would be too upset if Congress forced them into a near-term Shuttle-derived HLV program…assuming Congress can find the money for it.
Great article Doug!
I’m glad you mentioned again what had already been stated by the augustine commission, which most NASA Diehard Fanboys and Girls seem to have amnesia about. Great job on the point that people can’t just say the commercial sector will not work before it has been actually tested. The commercial sector is approaching space exploration with a fresh perspective which space exploration needs right now. If given a shot they will do big things, and I can’t wait for the SpaceX launch.
Quick thought: Have you noticed that when NASA buys services from russia they never consider that a commercial transaction? They don’t want commercial yet they depend on it all the time. That is pretty funny to me.
I’m no fan of the Ares I/V architecture, but the Constellation Program is equally as affordable as the Obama plan.
The Obama plan raises the NASA budget by at least $2 billion a year over the next 5 years. Over a ten year period, that’s $10 billion. The Constellation program in 2009 was being funded at $3.4 billion a year, that’s another $34 billion over the next 10 years. The shuttle was supposed to be decommissioned under Griffin’s plan in 2011: that’s a $3 billion a year program, another $30 billion over 10 years. Griffin also planned to decommission the ISS in 2016, that’s $2 billion a year, another $10 billion over 5 years. If you add the $9 billion already spent on the Constellation program, by 2020 or 2021, a total of $93 billion would have been spent. The Augustine Commission estimated that the development cost of the Constellation program would be $108 billion. At $10.4 billion a year in expenditures by 2020, Constellation spending would reach $108 billion before 2022.
My problem with the Constellation program was the Ares I. I don’t think the Ares I is a vehicle that is simple and safe enough for private commercial spaceflight companies to utilize.
However, Boeing’s inline shuttle derived vehicle with no SRBs is a much more attractive vehicle for private spaceflight companies, IMO. And you can still convert it into a heavy lift vehicle for beyond LEO missions by adding two SRBs. And its probably substantially cheaper than the Ares I/V architecture and the Obama plan.
I thought Norm Augustine did a nice job in explaining the job they did. And I also agree that the NASA message is not crisp and clear.
I also wonder why Bolden is not mentioning ULA, which is weird, especially since their Pres. & CEO testified before the Augustine Commission that they could man-rate Delta IV Heavy for $1.3B, and launch Orion for $300M/launch. They could also man-rate Atlas V for commercial and do $130M/launch. Both could be ready within 5 years, and would have greater than 20 percent performance margin.
I like SpaceX, but NASA should award ULA a sole-source contract to man-rate Delta, then open up a competition for a second launcher.
Regarding HLLV, it still seems to be a launcher without a payload, so I have no problems delaying a decision on it.
Doug:
The biggest problem with the Obama direction for NASA is credibility. First it was to kill off our manned space program. Then it was to fully support and accelerate it. Then it was to do nothing and just give lots of money to his supporters in Academia and commercial space… And now it is to go to Mars for less money than a Moon program. Right!
We can afford Constellation as long as NASA funds are not diverted for non-exploration projects, such as Green Aviation or Climate Research. And NASA can and should do it’s part to HELP commercial space, but not at the cost of abandoning it’s exploration mission.
I agree with Coastal Ron. A phased approach might work and it might sell politically (HEY LOOK, NEW JOBS IN ALABAMA!). I don’t know enough about the specifics to favor one rocket over the other.
One thing that bothers me is how much Orion might cost. I don’t know how much each capsule might add to the cost above and beyond the rocket. Jeff Greason has been quoted as saying the cost was quite high, which may have been one of the reasons Obama proposed canceling it.
The Atlas/Delta options have been around since the beginning when Griffin chose the Ares architecture. Advocates were shut out. With Griffin and Bush leaving and Ares having problems, there was room to reopen the discussion. Their views made it into the Augustine report, and a receptive Administration chose a modified version of the one of the options put forward.
Armstrong made the whole thing sound quite conspiratorial. It’s been a consistent theme for months. There’s been this small cadre of conspirators that somehow operated outside of Bolden’s authority and sold a completely unworkable program to a clueless President Obama. This just doesn’t wash with me.
Nelson Bridwell said “We can afford Constellation as long as NASA funds are not diverted for non-exploration projects, such as Green Aviation or Climate Research. And NASA can and should do it’s part to HELP commercial space, but not at the cost of abandoning it’s exploration mission.”
The first sentence seems to label you as a right-wing climate-change denier, but for arguments sake, let’s assume that you: 1) don’t care how the weather affects you or the businesses you buy from, and 2) don’t care about airlines being able to lower the cost of their single largest consumable expenditure. My question for you would be, how much could you save by eliminating those programs, and would that cover the budget over-runs that Constellation is projected to accrue?
For your second sentence, I think it is a rational concern. In my view, I believe that government run transportation systems (like the Shuttle & Ares I/V) do not have the ability or incentive to contain or lower costs. Commercial firms, especially when competition is involved, can provide the most value for the U.S. Taxpayer.
For LEO cargo and crew transportation, U.S. commercial firms have already started quoting prices for crew transportation. ULA has offered $300M to launch a man-rated Delta IV Heavy with an Orion, and $130M to launch an Atlas V for commercial crew. SpaceX has already quoted $20M/seat for commercial crew to LEO, which is well below the Soyuz cost of $45-55M/seat.
All of the commercial crew alternatives are cheaper than the Shuttle or Ares I, which means NASA could have more funds to apply towards exploration. No one could state that ULA does not have the knowledge or capability to do crew delivery services, so why should NASA be competing with private enterprise?
Unfortunately, without Ares I to front some of it’s development costs, Ares V turns into the most expensive launcher ($$/lb) ever…. 🙁
A factual point to note here: Robert Bigelow is working with Lockheed-Martin explicitly because he doesn’t want to be locked into a single launcher. He has already contracted a flight of the Falcon 9 (presumably with the Dragon capsule) and that is already on the SpaceX manifest for future flights, so he is spreading his money around a bit to make this happen.
What amazes me here is that the senators and congressmen involved with this debate insist upon only a single solution, and presume it is Ares I vs. Falcon 9 regarding the debate, with the solution being that one and only one of those vehicles can possibly be the winner. This may have been the debate in years past and is similar to perhaps a military procurement process, but the game has changed and the procurement isn’t happening.
While it was mentioned in the senate hearing, trying to compare Constellation vs. COTS is not even really comparing the same thing. The amounts being spent certainly are not the same for both programs, and it seems as though some of the senators in that hearing were thinking that the appropriations for COTS hasn’t happened yet and that it was a hypothetical program that perhaps might be done in the future but is still under discussion… as an alternative to Constellation.
Yes, I know that the manned spaceflight part is still under discussion and hasn’t been approved, but the questions by some of the senators seemed to show they thought the federal government was paying for the whole development program for both the Taurus II and the Falcon 9 on a cost-plus basis, and that the development of manned-rated vehicles going to the ISS on those vehicles will also be done on a cost-plus basis. Attempting to explain that the procurement of those vehicles is going to be something completely different and that private citizens (like Robert Bigelow) can also purchase flights from these companies in the same manner that the federal government is buying them is something that seems to be flying clear over their heads… and the heads of Armstrong and Cernan as well.
It amazes me too that the FUD spreading around that somehow manned spaceflight is going to end with the Obama administration, while Charles Bolden directly noted how he just hired a new group of astronauts this past year and has even scheduled them for future flights. If they are scheduled for an upcoming mission and there is no manned space program, somebody or something must be imaginary there. Astronauts will continue to fly, but it won’t be on the Space Shuttle. That is also not the Obama administration but rather the Bush administration which canceled the Shuttle program. The time to save the Shuttle from termination has already come and gone. Perhaps a couple more missions can be cobbled together like the Apollo-Soyuz mission was pieced together, but the end is here.
My #1 concern with having SpaceX and any “new space” company getting involved with the federal government at all is that such money corrupts. It already has and once you get stuck on the government milk machine, it is very difficult to impossible getting off of it later on. It is very hard to turn down money for a company that already has the capabilities that are now being asked to be done, so I don’t necessarily blame SpaceX for being in the position that they are in. Still, the real tragedy is that NASA under the Griffin leadership let Constellation get to this point.
If it wasn’t a huge disaster of a general spaceflight policy right now (frankly, either the old plan or the new one by the Obama administration), you would think that the original DIRECT supporters are now screaming “see I told you so”. Concerns about the impending doom coming down the space policy road have been foretold for years now, and the day has arrived to pay the price and face the consequences of previous policy decisions.
Robert Horning May 13, 2010 at 5:06 pm
Well stated.
I too have been mystified at the lack of comments about ULA from anyone at NASA. Atlas and Delta are proven, capable machines. For a “1st Generation” commercial launcher, Delta IV would be a good start. NASA should pay for the man-rating, and then buy launch services on a firm-fixed price basis. The risk is low, and it starts the transition to competitive pricing. Regardless, even Delta IV Heavy is cheaper than Ares I, and likely more safe.